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AGOSTINI et al. v.  FELTON et al.   A federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid under the Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by government employees under a program containing safeguards such as those present in New York City's Title I program. Accordingly, Aguilar, as well as that portion of its companion case, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, addressing a "Shared Time" program, are no longer good law.  

*ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, etal. v. SANDOVAL  Class action to enjoin the Departments decision to administer state drivers license examinations only in English, arguing that it violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Held: There is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI.

*ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION v. MURPHY ET VIR.    Held: Section §1415(i)(3)(B), the attorneys fees reimbursement section of IDEA 2004,  does not authorize prevailing parents to recover expert fees.

*BOARD OF EDUCATION OF POTTAWATOMIE v. EARLS   Drug testing of students upheld.

*Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett  Suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the State's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

*BRENTWOOD ACADEMY v. TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION   Court rules that voluntary state interscholastic athletic association engaged in state action when it enforced association rule against member school. Could have application in instances where classified student is denied participation due to "redshirting" or other restrictions.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

*BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC., etal. v. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES etal.  The catalyst theory is not a permissible basis for the award of attorneys fees under the FHAA and ADA.

BURLINGTON SCHOOL COMM. v. MASS. DEPT. OF ED  The grant of authority to a reviewing court under 1415(e)(2) includes the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.

CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GARRET F.  Held: The IDEA requires the District to provide Garret with the nursing services he requires during school hours. The IDEA's "related services" definition, Tatro, and the overall statutory scheme support the Court of Appeals' decision. The "related services" definition broadly encompasses those supportive services that "may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education," §1401(a)(17).

DAVIS v. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION  A private Title IX damages action may lie against a school board in cases of student-on-student harassment, but only where the funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which the recipient has actual knowledge, and that harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.

FLORENCE COUNTY SCH. DIST. FOUR v. CARTER  A court may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate education under IDEA.

GEBSER ET AL . v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT  The question in this case is when a school district may be held liable in damages in an implied right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (Title IX), for the sexual harassment of a student by one of the district's teachers. The Court concluded  that damages may not be recovered in those circumstances unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct.

*GONZAGA UNIVERSITY v. DOE  No private right of action under FERPA.

*GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL  By denying the Club access to the schools limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, Milford discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause.

GOSS v. LOPEZ  Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis and may not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process  Clause. Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation is so insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.

HENDRICK HUDSON DIST. BD. OF ED. v. ROWLEY   One of the first Supreme Court cases to set forth the definition of FAPE   under the  IDEA. The Court stated that The Act's requirement of a "free appropriate public education" is satisfied when the State provides personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the handicapped child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the State's educational standards, must approximate grade levels used in the State's regular education, and must comport with the child's IEP, as formulated in accordance with the Act's requirements. If the child is being educated in regular classrooms, as here, the IEP should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.   N.B.: THIS HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS  TO REQUIRE MORE THAN INSIGNIFICANT EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT- SEE N.E. v. RIDGEWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION, ABOVE.

HONIG v. DOE  "We believe that school officials are entitled to seek injunctive relief under 1415(e)(2) in appropriate cases. In any such action, 1415(e)(3) effectively creates a presumption in favor of the child's current educational placement which school officials can overcome only by showing that maintaining the child in his or her current placement is substantially likely to result in injury either to himself or herself, or to others."

IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. v. TATRO  Held that clean intermittent catheterization is a related service under IDEA, and set the standard of what is a related service.

OBERTI v. BOARD OF EDUCATION  "We construe IDEA's mainstreaming requirement to prohibit a school from placing a child with disabilities outside of a regular classroom if educating the child in the regular classroom, with supplementary aids and support services, can be achieved satisfactorily. In addition, if placement outside of a regular classroom is necessary for the child to receive educational benefit, the school may still be violating IDEA if it has not made sufficient efforts to include the child in school programs with nondisabled children whenever possible. We also hold that the school bears the burden of proving compliance with the mainstreaming requirement of IDEA, regardless of which party (the child and parents or the school) brought the claim under IDEA before the district court."

OLMSTEAD, COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. v. L. C.  Under Title II of the ADA, States are required to place persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions when the State’s treatment professionals have determined that community placement is appropriate, the transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not opposed by the affected individual, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.

*Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo  Teachers sometimes ask students, including respondents children, to score each others tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class. Claiming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA or Act), respondent filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the school district and school officials (petitioners). Held:Peer grading does not violate FERPA. Pp.39.

*Schaffer v. Weast, November 14, 2005, 04-698 Held: The burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief, whether that is the disabled child or the school district.

*Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams  The Sixth Circuit did not apply the proper standard in determining that respondent was disabled under the ADA because it analyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondents impairments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are of central importance to most peoples daily lives. "We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most peoples daily lives. The impairments impact must also be permanent or long-term."

*ZELMAN v. SIMMONS  Tuition aid to students for private schools, including religious schools, does not offend Establishment Clause.